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Abstract 
 
We analyze consumer preferences for airline service attributes between Ponta Delgada and Lisbon: the 
most important air corridor between the Azores and Mainland Portugal. Owing to stringent regulations, 
which fall under the European Union Public Service Obligations (PSOs) domain, there are no revealed 
preferences data suitable to study consumer preferences. Hence, we conduct a stated preferences choice 
game and estimate a microeconometric model à la McFadden. Our results are statistically significant and 
imply willingness to pay measures economically high for attributes such as punctuality warranties and 
comfort. Willingness to pay for additional daily flights is quite low. This result is important to how should 
the policy maker liberalize this sector. 
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1. Introduction 
 
We analyze consumer preferences for airline service attributes between Ponta 
Delgada and Lisbon: the most important air corridor between the Azores and Mainland 
Portugal. Owing to stringent regulations, which fall under the European Union Public 
Service Obligations (PSOs) domain, there are no revealed preferences data suitable to 
study consumer preferences. Hence, we conduct a stated preferences choice game and 
estimate a microeconometric model à la McFadden (1974). 
We note that our methodology is agnostic with respect to the geographical place of its 
implementation. However, we do have good reasons to focus our attention in the Ponta 
Delgada – Lisbon corridor: as we argue below, on the one hand, stated preferences data 
come especially handy, as there are no revealed preferences data, and, on the other 
hand, policy guidance is much needed. 
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The Azores are a Portuguese archipelago, with an autonomous government, in the 
North Atlantic, about two hours by flight west of Lisbon, with roughly the same latitude 
(36º) as Lisbon and New York. The Azores have a disperse and small territory, with 
nine inhabited islands, within 600 kilometers apart, with a total surface of 2.333 km² 
and a population of 241.000 inhabitants. Ponta Delgada is the main city of the Azores, 
in the island of São Miguel, the largest and richest island in the Azores. 
Given its geography and population, it should come as no surprise that airline services 
are commonly perceived as critical to the economic development and to the social 
cohesion of the Azores. Thus, there has been heavy governmental regulation in the 
airline services sector on, at least, two counts: (i) On equity grounds, inter-island 
mobility and equal access to other regions regardless of island of origin are politically 
understood as necessary to the social cohesion of the Azores. Hence, inter-island 
mobility is and has been treated as a public service obligation (on this, more below). 
SATA – the Azorean flag carrier, owned by the Azorean Government – provides and 
has provided such service as a monopolist operating under stringent regulations, 
regarding fares, flight capacity, and flight frequencies, among other service attributes. 
(ii) On efficiency grounds, due to an arguably lacking demand, on the one hand, and 
high capital and operating costs, on the other, airline services are and have been thought 
of as a natural monopoly. 
Under these arguments, there has never been an open skies policy in the Azores. 
Nowadays, the Azorean Government enforces stringent regulations on air 
transportation, which is allowed in the European Union within the framework of Article 
4 of Council Regulation 2408/92. In fact, until 2004 only one airline at a time flew 
between a given Azorean gateway and Mainland Portugal. Since 2005, two airlines – 
SATA and TAP (the Portuguese flag carrier, owned by the Portuguese Government) – 
operate our route of interest, Ponta Delgada – Lisbon, via a code share agreement, as the 
sole and joint concessionaires of air transportation services between the Azores and 
Mainland Portugal. 
However, both SATA and TAP are obliged to follow a stringent set of regulations 
regarding several dimensions of their services, including fares, flight frequencies, flight 
capacities, and punctuality warranties and so on.1 In essence, both SATA and TAP have 
to implement twin operation strategies and procedures, with virtually no degrees of 
freedom whatsoever. Therefore, there are no revealed preferences data that can shed 
light on consumer preferences. Hence, we implement a stated preferences choice game 
and estimate a discrete choice model à la McFadden (1974) in order to learn about 
consumer preferences, and, concomitantly, provide useful information for policymakers 
and operators alike. 
We resort to a stated preferences choice game and associated discrete choice model 
since with this methodology, and to be brief, airline customers are asked to choose 
between competing alternatives that differ, in a trade-off sense, in several service 
attributes. Hence, our choice-based approach is based on a quite realistic task that 
airline customers perform every day. In addition, our willingness to pay measures are 
consistent with utility theory (see Merino-Castelló, 2003, and Hanley et al., 2001, for 
extensive discussions on stated preference discrete choice models and the reasons 
behind the growing popularity of such models). 
                                                 
1
 See Official Journal of the European Union, 2004/C 248/06, 7.10.2004 (http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/JOIndex.do?), the European Union policy directive that regulates flights between the Azores and 
Mainland Portugal. 
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Several authors have successfully applied discrete choice models to transportation 
policy issues in a number of ways and settings (see, among others, Ben-Akiya and 
Lerman, 1985, Wardman, 1988, for surveys, and Burris and Pendalya, 2002, and Rudel, 
2005, for applications). Cao and Mokhtarian (2005a, 2005b) argue that individuals 
adapt their travel-related strategies according to a number of objective and subjective 
influences, and, hence, one should consider individual experiences and characteristics 
when forecasting the expected outcome of a given policy choice. We follow this 
reasoning and control in our empirical exercise for a number of individual 
characteristics. 
The evidence that we provide also sheds light on consumer preferences towards flight 
frequency. Thus, we can use this evidence as an input in the debate if we are indeed in 
the presence of a natural monopoly or not. Hence, our paper contributes to the literature 
on the application of Public Service Obligations (PSOs) in air transport within the 
European Union. As Williams and Pagliari (2004) argue, despite the widespread 
application of PSOs across the European Union, with the aim of promoting sustainable 
air services to remote regions for economic development purposes, as is the Azorean 
case, there is very little research on the routes operated under the PSO umbrella. Our 
paper employs a stated preference discrete choice exercise that elicits consumer 
preferences and, thus, provides interesting demand side information that may be used in 
the design of the above mentioned PSOs regulations and corresponding consumer 
welfare implications. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents our 
econometric model. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Data 
 
2.1. The Sated Preferences Choice Game 
 
Our stated preferences choice game was implemented through questionnaires 
ministered at Ponta Delgada's Airport, near the boarding gate, after security checkpoint. 
A total of 347 questionnaires were asked from April 27th to May 5th of 2005. The 
number of questionnaires ensures a number of observations large enough to estimate the 
econometric model described below. The interviews were conducted in Portuguese. 
Only people who were about to take a flight from Ponta Delgada to Lisbon were 
interviewed, to make sure that they were familiar with the questions asked. Moreover, 
people who were traveling with tourist packages, namely, packages with a combination 
of hotel, air travel, rent a car, and so on, were not considered since these people did not 
have a clear idea of the exact cost of the air travel portion of their travel package. 
The questionnaires had 3 sections. In the first section, a number of questions were 
asked about the trip, such as: airline; connection at destination; connecting airline; fare 
class (business, economy); departure time; trip cost; trip motive; trip frequency; who 
pays for the trip; number of people flying with the interviewee; advance of purchasing 
the ticket; mode of purchasing the ticket; and frequent flyer program. 
In the second section, the individuals were confronted with a stated preferences 
choice game. In particular, with the aid of a laptop computer, the individuals were asked 
to choose one of two virtual airlines that differed in the following dimensions, based, on 
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the one hand, on the status quo,2 and, on the other, on what we observe elsewhere, 
namely, in more deregulated and competitive markets: 
 
Attribute Level
0
1
2
Business Cheap Fare
0 30% 100%
1 10% 50%
2 0% 30%
Business Cheap Fare
0 Cold sandwiches + drink Not available
1 Hot food + drink Cold sandwiches + drink
2 A la carta (when buying the ticket) Hot food + drink
0
1
0
1
2
0
1
2
No compensation for delay
Free ticket for the same trip
Reimbursement of the cost of the ticket
Reliability
Frequency
2 flights / day
4 flights / day
6 flights / day
Penaly for 
changes in 
the ticket
Free Food
Comfort Small space between seatsWide space between seats
Price
Definition
P + 20%
P
P - 20%
 
Figure 1: Service Attributes and Levels 
 
Other attributes which we may care about were left out of the game in order to 
preserve a good understanding of the trade-offs involved (see Sudman and Bradburn, 
1982, for practical issues on questionnaire design). As a corollary, travel time was left 
out since it is, to a great extent, exogenous both to the operator and to the regulator. 
The following picture is a "Print Screen" of WinMint v. 2.1 (in Portuguese), the 
software used to randomly generate the game menus: 
 
                                                 
2
 The status quo, and to be brief, entails: two fares, economy and business; no penalty to change tickets 
within a year; cold sandwiches if economy, hot food if business; small space between seats for both fares; 
two flights per day; and no compensation for delay. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 39 (2008): 1-13 
 5
 
 
Figure 2: Print Screen 
 
In essence, the stated preferences choice game presented the passengers with a choice 
between two virtual airlines, none of which dominated the other in all dimensions, as 
expected. That is, all games considered had trade-offs built-in. Each individual played 
the game 10 times. 
In the third and last section, the individuals were asked about their socioeconomic 
status, such as: residence county; number of people living in the household; number of 
workers in the household; household income; age; gender; educational attainment; 
sector of occupation; type of job; weekly working hours and net monthly individual 
income. 
 
 
2.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 summarizes some of the continuous variables in the data set: 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean S. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Trip cost (€) 347 122,37 37,98 - 250,00 
Net household monthly income (€) 347 2.645,08 1.679,55 150,00 12.500,00 
Weekly working hours (hours) 347 18,80 13,10 0,00 60,00 
Net individual monthly income (€) 347 1.196,04 1.325,54 0,00 10.000,00 
Age (years) 347 36,53 13,57 19,00 85,00 
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Mean reported one way ticket cost is € 122. In addition, we note that most 
interviewees flew with SATA, in a domestic flight with no connection and were males. 
Most interviewees, 67%, bought the tickets with one week or less in advance of 
departure day. The travel agency was the mode of purchasing ticket chosen by 69% of 
the individuals. While 50% of the interviewees paid for their tickets, 35% of the 
interviewees had their tickets paid for their companies. A slight majority, 51%, of the 
interviewees had some sort of frequent flyer program. Perhaps not surprisingly, many 
interviewees held a university degree, 51%, since being at the boarding gate is not a 
random event across the overall Portuguese population. 
 
 
3. The Econometric Model and Willingness to Pay Measures 
 
The econometric work carried out in the paper is based on the random utility theory 
(see McFadden 1974, Greene, 2003, or Train, 2003), briefly described below. The 
random utility of alternative j for an individual n, Ujn, is given by:  
 
jnjnjn VU ε+=
         (1) 
 
Vjn is the systematic or representative utility (conditional indirect utility) and εjn is a 
random term. 
Individual n chooses alternative j if and only if Ujn ≥ Uin, ∀ i≠j. In such a case, and 
given (1): 
 
ijinjnjninininjnjn VVVV ≠∀−≤−⇔+≥+ ,εεεε
      
 
As utilities are random variables, we can obtain the probability that individual n 
chooses alternative j as:  
 
ijinjnjninjn VVPP ≠∀−≤−= )( εε
      (2) 
 
When the random term εjn follows a Gumbel distribution, Pjn reads (see McFadden, 
1973): 
 
∑
=
= N
i
V
V
jn
in
jn
e
eP
1
         (3) 
 
N is the number of alternatives. The expression for Pjn given by (3) is the essence of 
the well-known multinomial logit model. 
We estimate a conditional logit model, since we have several observations (games) 
per individual, and, hence, we control for individual fixed effects. The estimation was 
carried out with STATA Intercooled 8. As usual in the literature (Bateman et al., 2002, 
Espíno et al., 2003, Fowkes and Wardman, 1998, Fowkes, 2000, and Louviére et al., 
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2000), we estimate two alternative specifications of the conditional indirect utility, 
Model 1 and Model 2, described below. 
In Model 1 we do not consider interactions between attributes and the conditional 
indirect utility reads: 
 
2,1,21
21
21
21
=++++
++++=
jRRFLR
FFPCV
RRRFLR
FFPCj
R
θθθθ
θθθθ
      (4) 
 
In Model 2 we consider interactions between attributes, and, hence, we write the 
conditional indirect utility as follows: 
 
2,1,)()(
)()(
)(
21
21
2211
2211
=++++
+++
+++++
+++=
jRWRW
FLR
FEcFEc
PWCV
WRRWRR
RFLR
EFFEFF
PWPCj
R
CC
θθθθ
θθ
θθθθ
θθθ
     (5) 
 
Table 2 provides a list with variables’ definitions: 
Table 2: Variables’ definitions 
Variable Meaning 
C travel cost (Euros) 
P penalty for changes in the ticket 
F
1
 binary variable equal to 1 if food level equals 1 
F2 binary variable equal to 1 if food level equals 2 
LR binary variable equal to 1 if comfort (more leg room) is 1 
Fr daily flight frequency (continuous variable) 
R1 binary variable equal to 1 if reliability level equals 1 
R2 binary variable equal to 1 if reliability level equals 2 
Ec binary variable equal to 1 if fare is economy 
W binary variable equal to 1 if trip motive is work 
 
After estimation of the models above, it is possible to compute the willingness to pay 
(WTP) for improvements in service attributes. For continuous variables the subjective 
value of attribute q reads: 
 
dq
dc
c
V
q
V
I
V
q
V
WTPq −=
∂
∂
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
−=
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I stands for income, c for (monetary) cost and c
V
I
V
∂
∂
−=
∂
∂
. Intuitively, WTP is given by 
the appropriate slope of the conditional indirect utility. For binary variables the relevant 
expression is as follows: 
 
I
V
VV
WTPq
∂
∂
−
=
01
 
 
Vi is the conditional indirect utility when the level of the attribute equals i=0,1. 
 
 
4. Empirical results and discussion 
 
4.1. Empirical results 
 
Table 3 summarizes the results for models 1 and 2. The signs are as expected and the 
estimates are statistically significant, with the notable exception of the interaction terms. 
Adding the interaction terms seems to matter little, both at a qualitative level and at a 
quantitative level. 
Table 3: Estimation Results for Model 1 and Model 2 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Cost (θC) -0.0251 * (-18.02) 
-0.0252 * 
(-18.04) 
Penalty (θP) -0.0140 * (-6.97) 
-0.0138 * 
(-5.79) 
Food 1 (θF1) 0.2505 * (3.77) 
0.7208 * 
(2.86) 
Food 2 (θF2) 0.4403 * (6.24) 
0.8944 * 
(3.83) 
Leg Room (θLR) 0.5123 * (8.98) 
0.5135 * 
(8.99) 
Frequency (θFr) 0.1266 * (7.09) 
0.1279 * 
(7.15) 
Reliability 1 (θR1) 0.9894 * (14.68) 
0.9868 * 
(11.46) 
Reliability 2 (θR2) 0.8294 * (11.66) 
0.8667 * 
(11.46) 
Food 1*Economy (θF1Ec)  -0.5005 *** (-1.93) 
Food 2*Economy (θF2Ec)  -0.4828 ** (-2.03) 
Penalty*Work (θPW)  -0.0009 * (-0.23) 
Reliability 1+Work (θR1W)  0.0174 * (0.13) 
Reliability 2*Work (θR2W)  -0.0849 * (-0.70) 
Log – L (θ) -3959 -3956 
Log – L (0) -4207 -4207 
Number of observations 6940 6940 
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Note: * 1%; ** 5%;*** 10% 
In order to obtain a feel of the economic importance of these results we compute the 
willingness to pay measures, presented in Tables 4 and 5. 
Table 4: Willingness to Pay Measures for Model 1 
WTP – Model 1 
Event WTP (Euros) 
Penalty for changes in the ticket 0.57 
Food: level 0 to level 1 9.97 
Food: level 0 to level 2 17.52 
Comfort (more leg room) 20.39 
Frequency 5.04 
Reliability: level 0 to level 1 39.39 
Reliability: level 0 to level 2 33.02 
 
Given that the sample mean cost of a one way ticket is about € 122, we find that 
willingness to pay measures are quite high in an economic sense. In particular, the 
willingness to pay to improve reliability from level 0 to 1 is about € 39 or 32% of the 
sample mean of the reported one way ticket cost. Apparently, comfort is quite valuable: 
the willingness to pay to have some more leg room is more than € 20.   
Willingness to pay measures do not change substantially when we consider 
interactions between trip attributes (Model 2): 
Table 5: Willingness to Pay Measures for Model 2 
WTP – Model 2 
Event WTP (Euros) 
Penalty for changes in the ticket  
Trip motive: work/businnes 0.58 
Trip motive: other 0.55 
Food: level 0 to level 1  
Economy class 8.74 
Other type of fare 28.59 
Food: level 0 to level 2  
Economy class 16.33 
Other type of fare 35.48 
Comfort (more leg room) 20.37 
Frequency 5.08 
Reliability: level 0 to level 1  
Trip motive: work/businnes 39.83 
Trip motive: other 39.14 
Reliability: level 0 to level 2  
Trip motive: work/businnes 31.01 
Trip motive: other 34.38 
 
We note that the willingness to pay for one additional flight per day is about 5 Euros. 
Hence, the subjective value of increased daily flight frequency is far less, in an 
economic sense, than the subjective value of improvement in attributes such as 
reliability or comfort. 
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4.2. Discussion 
 
In this section, we capitalize on the wealth of individual socio-demographic 
information gathered in our questionnaire in order to assess if consumer preferences 
vary in a systematic way across consumer groups. Cao and Mokhtarian (2005a, 2005b) 
argue that individual specific characteristics influence travel strategies, and, therefore, 
may influence willingness to pay measures. In our exercise we are able to study if there 
is systematic and statistically significant variation in the determinants of airline choice 
across consumer groups as our dataset has a plethora of individual socio-demographic 
information. 
A rather obvious way of distinguishing between different consumer groups is to 
consider the motive of the trip. In our questionnaire, we considered five different trip 
motives: (1) work; (2) leisure; (3) studies; (4) family; and (5) other. Individuals who 
were traveling for work related reasons are the largest group in the sample (41.5%). 
Individuals who were traveling for leisure are the second largest group in the sample 
(32.5%). Finally, individuals who were traveling due to their studies or to visit their 
families comprise 5.7% and 9.2% of the sample, respectively. Hence, work and leisure 
are by far the most important self-reported trip motives in our sample and we focus on 
them. To investigate if willingness to pay measures vary with trip motive in a 
significant way, we split the sample and estimate both Model 1 and Model 2 for the 
subsamples of interest. To save on space, below we report our results for Model 1 only. 
The coefficients obtained for the sample of persons who were travelling for work 
related reasons are remarkably similar to the coefficients obtained for the sample of 
persons who were not travelling for work related reasons (and for the overall sample). 
In fact, and focusing on Model 1, a log-likelihood ratio test fails to reject that the 
coefficients obtained for the sample of persons traveling for work related reasons are 
not jointly statistically different from the coefficients obtained for the sample of 
individuals who were not travelling for work related reasons. To be more precise, the 
log-likelihood ratio test obtains the value of 12.2438 whereas the critical values for the 
relevant Chi-squared are 13.36, 15.51, and 20.09 at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance 
levels, respectively. Hence, it comes as no surprise that the willingness to pay measures 
do not vary much in an economic sense for these two groups of consumers. 
Nevertheless, we do note that persons who were not travelling for work related reasons 
do exhibit slightly lower willingness to pay measures to experience improvements in 
airline service attributes considered in the stated choice game. By the same token, we 
split the sample according to the trip motive leisure and, thus, we distinguish between 
leisure and non-leisure. Once more, the coefficients are remarkably similar across 
subsamples and a log-likelihood ratio test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients are not jointly statistically different. In fact, the log-likelihood ratio test is 
5.5428, well below the critical values at the usual significance levels. 
As employment status is a likely determinant of willingness to pay to experience an 
improvement in airline services, we use the information in our dataset regarding weekly 
hours worked. About 26% of the individuals in the sample report zero hours of work per 
week and mean weekly hours of work for the overall sample is, quite naturally, as low 
as 18. As quite a few interviewees reported working only a few hours of work per week 
or none at all, we define fulltime workers as those who work at least 20 hours per week. 
According to this criterion, fulltime workers comprise 64% of the sample. We estimate 
Model 1 for the subsamples of fulltime workers and non fulltime workers. A log-
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likelihood ratio test (24.82) strongly rejects that the coefficients do not jointly differ 
across employment status even at the 1% significance level. Perhaps as expected, 
willingness to pay measures are higher for fulltime workers than for non fulltime 
workers (with the exception of willingness to pay to experience an improvement from 
food level 0 – no food – to food level 2 – hot food). Willingness to pay for more 
comfort (leg room) is € 27.77 for fulltime workers and € 12.73 for non fulltime workers. 
Quite interestingly, willingness to pay for an additional daily flight is € 6.40 for fulltime 
workers and less than half of this value or € 3.09 for non fulltime workers. It should be 
noted that in unreported regressions we find that the above mentioned results are robust 
to alternative definitions of fulltime work. 
Finally, we note that willingness to pay measures for an additional daily flight are 
quite similar across the different consumer groups considered, which took into account 
trip motive and employment status and frequent flier experience. In fact, according to 
Model 1, willingness to pay measures for an additional daily flight range from as low as 
€ 3.09 for non fulltime workers (persons who work less than 20 hours of work per week, 
including persons who do not work at all) to € 6.40 and € 6.59 for fulltime workers and 
individuals who reported to be travelling for work related reasons. In order to assess if 
willingness to pay for an additional flight varies with the number of daily flights, we 
estimate a modified version of Model 2 which, in its essence, allows for a decreasing 
marginal value of daily flight frequency. In particular, we include as a covariate the 
product of frequency and an indicator variable that flags cases where flight frequency is 
the highest or 6 flights per day. Under the PSOs regulations, SATA and TAP must 
operate at least one flight per day between Ponta Delgada and Lisbon. However, in 
practice, there are at least two flights per day year round and in the Summer time – 
when tourism demand for the Azores peaks – there are three or more flights per day but 
hardly ever six. Hence, in our stated choice exercise we allow daily flight frequency to 
range from 2 to 6. Perhaps as expected, we find a decreasing marginal value of 
additional daily flights. When daily flight is already as high as 6 then willingness to pay 
for an additional daily flight decreases from € 7.18 to € 5.76. The interaction term 
introduced to allow a non-constant marginal value of additional daily flights is 
statistically significant at the 5% significance level. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The McFadden Discrete Choice Model is an informative tool about consumer 
preferences over different service attributes across competing alternatives, especially in 
environments where revealed preferences do not take us far. Obviously, this is the case 
of airline services in the Ponta Delgada – Lisbon corridor, where air transport is 
regulated as a Public Service Obligation (PSO) within the European Union legal 
framework, and there are no data which can be used in a revealed preferences exercise. 
Thus, a stated preferences exercise was conducted to reveal consumer preferences. 
Policymakers and operators alike may use this information on consumer preferences in 
their service design strategies in their quest to promote consumer welfare. 
The main results were as expected from utility theory and some willingness to pay 
measures are quite high, in an economic sense, such as regarding punctuality 
(reliability) and comfort. However, some other willingness to pay measures were found 
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to be revealingly low. This is the case of willingness to pay for increases in daily flight 
frequency: about 5 Euros. Willingness to pay for additional daily flights is remarkably 
similar across the different consumer groups considered, taking into account, namely, 
trip motive and employment status. However, it should be noted that the data suggest 
that willingness to pay for an additional daily flight decreases with daily flight 
frequency. The low willingness to pay for additional daily flight result is somewhat 
puzzling considering that the Ponta Delgada – Lisbon corridor is the most important 
corridor servicing the Azores and that quite often flights are fully booked and waiting 
lists several day long. Taken at face value, this anecdotal evidence on waiting lists 
suggests that flight frequency is a binding constraint and that passengers would be 
willing to pay a sizeable amount to have such constraint relaxed. It turns out not to be 
the case. In unreported regressions, we find no interesting differences with respect to 
willingness to pay for an additional daily flight for those persons who fly frequently 
between Ponta Delgada and Lisbon (at least once a year) and for non frequent fliers 
(those persons who never travelled before or travel less than once a year). 
Instead, our result suggests that passengers do not perceive flight availability as a 
bidding constraint. In addition, this result should be upward biased in the sense that we 
did not interview a random sample of the population but people who were actually 
flying, and, hence, everything else the same, more willing to pay for increased flight 
availability. However, it should be noted that this result does not imply that there is no 
demand for extra flights. It is logically coherent with a scenario of a highly elastic 
demand. It simply suggests that there is no demand for more flights at increased cost. 
But there may be demand for more flights at given or lower prices. 
We also note that this result may be influenced by the interviewee's own judgment 
about his ability to secure a flight through, say, his own planning in advance. As 
Kahneman (2003) argues, individuals, in general, are prone to over estimate their own 
ability in a number of settings due to overconfidence. Overconfidence is well 
documented in many contexts and bears interesting efficiency implications (Kahneman, 
2003). It is also quite interesting to note that the willingness to pay for avoiding 
penalties for changing tickets is quite low: less than one Euro. Pereira et al (2005) find 
similar results to ours to the Funchal (Madeira, to Portugal) – Lisbon route. Like us, in 
their study willingness to pay measures seem lower for attributes arguably perceived as 
endogenous from the interviewee's perspective, in the sense that the interviewee may 
believe that he may act in a way to avoid penalties, secure flights and so on. By the 
same reasoning, willingness to pay measures for experiencing improvements in service 
attributes largely perceived exogenous by the passengers, such as leg room, food service 
on board and company policy regarding punctuality warranties, are economically 
substantial when compared to the fares actually paid. An interesting line for future 
research ought to investigate if indeed stated preferences based willingness to pay 
measures for service attributes are influenced by overconfidence from the part of 
passengers. 
Airline regulators and operators alike should take heed of these results to root their 
policies and operations in deep, structural consumer preferences parameters. 
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